In the three decades since its publication, Robert Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics (1981, hereafter WCWP) has become received wisdom in international relations. As a reflection of its profound influence, many scholars -especially younger theorists -have absorbed the ideas developed in the book without now recognizing or acknowledging their origins. The approach developed in WCWP has only gained in importance. Written in a time of American decline, it remains relevant to our current era of unipolarity and the continuing rise of China. Even though the challenge of the Soviet Union and the competition with Japan both passed without major war, and were followed by a period of American renewal, Gilpin forecasts -perhaps presciently -a bleak future of competition and struggle between Washington and Beijing. WCWP is well worth revisiting.
Gilpin's core insight is that states seek to build international orders that reflect their interests. As coalitions of coalitions, states have unique preferences and aim to shape the rules of international order to the point where the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits of action. Small to medium powers are "rule takers" for the most part, but great powers have the potential to provide order and craft rules that privilege their domestic coalitions over those in other countries. International order, in this now broadly accepted view, is not neutral but reflects the interests and perhaps the compromises of the major powers. Order matters to world politics, as do the rules that comprise that order.
Thus, countries struggle over the basic rules and benefits of world politics.
Somewhat more controversially, Gilpin posited that the dynamic distribution of capabilities is the primary driver of change and war. Unlike neorealists who gave pride of place to the static distribution (Waltz 1979) , Gilpin argued that countries were subject to the "law of uneven growth," which produced an ever evolving and unstable set of relative capabilities and power. Technologically advanced states initially enjoy rapid rates of economic growth and increased capabilities, and thus greater influence over the international order. But the diffusion of technology and economic convergence, as well as the burdens of international leadership, eventually lead to relative economic decline.
Benefiting from the advantages of backwardness and new technological innovations, other powers begin to grow more rapidly and challenge the earlier "generation." As these rapidly growing powers rise, their interests almost inevitably clash with the rules of the existing international order. Declining states could give way, Gilpin observed, but rarely do so. The conflicts between declining and rising powers, he concluded, have been resolved historically by hegemonic war. WCWP emphasized the decline of the United States in the 1970s, but was vague on the challengers to American rule, although in other works Gilpin pointed more directly to Japan and the European Union (Gilpin 1987) and China (Gilpin 2000) . Both the Soviet Union in the Cold War and Japan afterwards turned out to be failed competitors who never rose to equality with the United States. Gilpin's model of world politics, however, resonates with current fears of a rising China which does appear on track to overtake the United States within coming decades.
Though important to the discipline of international relations and still relevant today, WCWP left several key questions unresolved. Drawing on scholarship in the intervening decades, I sketch preliminary answers in each of three sections below. First, why do states comply with biased international orders, or why is there so little coercion in world politics? Gilpin introduced the concept of a hierarchy of prestige within the anarchic international system, which itself relied on a reputation for power or coercion (1981, (29) (30) (31) (32) . Going beyond Gilpin's sophisticated but still fundamentally realist view of world politics, I argue that international order rests on the authority of a dominant state over subordinate states who recognize its rule as legitimate. Although relations occur within the shadow of coercion, as in all authoritative political systems, dominant states do not require coercion to obtain preferred outcomes or even to enforce their rules on a dayto-day basis in relations with subordinate states. Authority is a more efficient form of rule than is coercion.
Second, why are hegemons liberal and, in turn, why have the most successful international orders of the last two centuries been liberal? This is the great unanswered question of hegemonic stability theory, with which Gilpin is often associated. The answer follows from the authoritative nature of international order. To accept the authority of another state over more or less of one's own policies is an awesome decision, perhaps the most important one a state can make. The power to set rules for subordinates is also the power to abuse those rules. Subordinate states will likely accept the authority of a dominant state only if that state can credibly commit not to act opportunistically or exploit them at some future date. Because the domestic authority of their own governments are limited and, by necessity, they must rely on market-based rules, liberal states are more credible in their promises to govern others lightly and fairly. Hegemons need not be liberal, and being hegemonic does not necessarily make a state marketoriented. Rather, the correlation between hegemony and liberalism emerges because of an underlying selection mechanism: liberal states are simply better able to acquire authority and dominance over other states.
Third, why is there so little war and change, or why is international order so robust? As Gilpin recognized, and Ikenberry (2001; 2011) has argued in more detail, international orders lock-in particular sets of interests that then endure over time. But why do rules stick in what remains an anarchic and "thinly" institutionalized international system? Both states and private actors adapt to particular authorities and their rules of order. As a social construct, authority is an equilibrium, a set of behaviors by ruler and ruled -or dominant and subordinate states -that neither has an incentive to change. Once that mutual equilibrium is reached, actors take the rules of order as "given" and adjust their investments and assets accordingly. Having done so, these actors then acquire an interest in preserving the rules as they exist. In short, the actors become "vested" in that order. It is not just power that is dynamic, as for Gilpin, but interests as well, and these interests tend over time to conform to prevailing rules. In this way, order becomes self-reinforcing. Vesting does not overturn the law of uneven growth on which Gilpin focused, but it does suggest why order can endure long after the dominant state has declined in power capabilities or prestige. It also suggests the possibility that potential challengers can be converted into supporters as they too become vested in the existing international order. This possibility is central to the debate over the future of China, which I examine in the Conclusion to this paper.
Why do states comply with biased international orders?
Gilpin (1981, (29) (30) (31) (32) argues that, even within anarchy, states are ranked in a "hierarchy of power and prestige." As the "reputation for power," prestige "refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to a state's capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power." This perception, in turn, ultimately rests on the "successful use of power, and especially through victory in war." Although possessing a moral and functional basis, the hierarchy of prestige is, in the end, determined by the relative coercive capabilities of states. Along with the distribution of power itself, the hierarchy of prestige is central to the construction and maintenance of international order.
Yet, in an oft-cited critique of hegemonic stability theory, McKeown (1989) argued that hegemons -Great Britain and the United States, in particular --rarely if ever appear to use coercion to create international order. The mechanism central to the theory is, thus, inconsistent with the historical record. Although there are notable examples -the Suez Crisis of 1956, sanctions against Cuba and other "rogue" states --there is just not enough coercion by dominant states to support the conclusion that order is created and sustained by the use of force by one country over others. In this way, the hierarchy of prestige is inadequate to explain the widespread and relatively stable international orderand importantly, the compliance with that order --that we observe. 2 Gilpin posits that prestige is "the functional equivalent of the role of authority in domestic politics." In limiting prestige to its "equivalent," he is hampered by a residual realism. In a classic fallacy of composition, Gilpin assumes that since the system is anarchic, all relations between units must likewise be anarchic and that, as a result, there can be no authority by one state over another. Although sensitive to the need for legitimacy in international orders, Gilpin stops short of recognizing the important role of authority in world politics.
Authority is, simply put, rightful rule. As a bundle of rights and obligations, authority entails a) the right by a ruler, in this case a dominant state, to issue certain limited commands, b) the duty by the ruled, here a collective of individuals organized into a subordinate state, to comply with these rules to the extent they are able, and c) the right of the ruler or dominant state to enforce its commands in the event of noncompliance (Lake 2009a, 17-21) . In domestic political systems, authority is typically understood to follow from formal-legal institutions. The leader's ability to command citizens, and the citizen's willingness to comply, follow from the law position or office that the leader holds. Although perhaps useful for analyzing established domestic hierarchies, this formal-legal conception suffers from a chicken-and-egg problem that makes it of dubious utility for the study of international relations. If political authority derives from lawful office, law must precede authority. But if political authority creates law, then authority must precede lawful office. Neither law nor authority can explain its own creation, and thus in all political systems authority must originate in something other than a formal-legal order.
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Authority can derive from many other sources, including charisma, tradition, and religion. In international relations, authority mostly rests on social contracts in which dominant states provide political orders to subordinate states of sufficient value to offset their loss of autonomy (Lake 2009a, 34-40) . Both dominant and subordinate states are better off than they would be in their next best alternative, reasonably assumed in international relations to be a Hobbesian state-of-nature. The gains from entering an international civil society are unlikely to be distributed evenly or even fairly between dominant and subordinate states -after all, as Gilpin recognized, the ability to write the rules of international order is a power that few states fail to exploit for their own benefit.
The "glue" that holds authority relationships together is not equity but rather the gains from order relative to each state's next best alternative.
Authority relations, in turn, condition the behaviors of dominant and subordinate states alike in important ways (see Lake 2009a, Chapters 4 and 5). Dominant states must produce the promised order, even when it is costly to do so. One manifestation of this 3 I argue that formal-legal authority also ultimately rests on a social contract. International anarchy means that there is no third party enforcement and, by implication, all national constitutions must be self-enforcing contracts that rest on something other than law, which is endogenous to that contract. Hierarchy between states implies that domestic constitutions are ultimately enforced by the dominant state. As particularly clear examples, the United States today is the guarantor of the domestic constitutional orders in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Leaders stay in power because the United States supports them, and if the United States were to withdraw its guarantee, political chaos and renewed cycling would likely ensue (but note that the guarantee does not necessarily require the continued presence of troops in either country). The same could be said, although to a lesser degree, for U.S. subordinates in the Caribbean and Central America and, to an ever smaller degree, in U.S. subordinates in early postwar Europe. This external enforcement of the domestic social contract by the United States is indicative of the degree of hierarchy exercised over countries in each region. responsibility is that dominant states are significantly more likely to join crises in which a subordinate state is involved. Dominant states must also credibly commit not to abuse their authority over subordinates, a task made more difficult in unipolarity and, thus, possibly driving the United States to tie its hands even more firmly through multilateralism today than in the past. 4 Enjoying the fruits of the political order, subordinate states relative to non-subordinates spend less on defense and engage in higher levels of international trade, especially with others tied to the same dominant state.
Legitimating the policies of their protector, subordinates are also more likely to follow dominant states into wars and especially to join coalitions of the willing, even though hath no foundation but in the opinion and belief of the people" (quoted in Williams 2006, 265) . Flathman (1980, 29) develops this point more fully, arguing that sustained punishment "is impossible without substantial agreement among the members of the association about those very propositions whose rejection commonly brings coercion into play." If recognized as legitimate, the dominant state acquires the ability to punish individuals within the subordinate state because of the broad backing of others. In extremis, an individual may deny any obligation to comply with the dominant state's rules, but if the larger community of which he is part recognizes the force of that state's commands and supports its right to punish him for violating these commands, then that individual can still be regarded as bound by the dominant state's authority (Flathman 1980, 30) . Similarly, the dominant state can enforce specific edicts even in the face of opposition if its general body of commands is accepted as legitimate by a sufficiently large number of the members of the subordinate state. In both cases, the dominant state's capacity to enforce its rules rests on the collective affirmation and possibly active consent of its subjects in the subordinate state (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, 133; Bernard 1962, 169) . Because a sufficient portion of the subordinate state's members accept the dominant state and its edicts as rightful, the dominant state can employ force against individual free riders and even dissidents. Knowing that a sufficient number of others support the dominant state, in turn, potential free riders and dissidents are deterred from violating the rules, and overt force is rendered unnecessary or, at least, unusual. In this sense, political authority is never a dyadic trait between a dominant state and a single subject, but derives from a collective -the subordinate state --that confers rights upon the dominant state. As Blau (1963, 312) violence may be necessary to prevent widespread violation of commands and, thus, the erosion of authority. 6 It is a mistake to draw too clear a distinction between authority and coercion (see Ikenberry 2011) . All authority entails a measure of coercion, at least as an enforcement mechanism -albeit one recognized as legitimate by those over whom it is wielded.
As an equilibrium, authority naturally entails relatively high levels of compliance, even if the rules issued by the dominant state are biased in its favor. Compliance occurs not just because rule is rightful; indeed, legitimacy is, in many ways, nothing more than the recognition by subordinates that it is in their interests to respect the rules of the dominant state. Rather, given the alternatives, as well as the community's acceptance of the dominant state's right to enforce its rules, states comply because they are better off doing so than not. Subordinates value order over chaos, even if the order that exists favors the ruler more than the ruled. And as long as the community of which they are part grants the dominant state the right to punish defectors, individual subordinates are deterred from breaking the rules or even challenging the dominant state's right to make rules. In domestic politics, Levi (1988, 52-67) The link between hegemony and efficiency and international economic openness was always the Achilles's heel of hegemonic stability theory (Lake 1993 To put this another way, great power does not produce liberalism; liberalism is likely to produce greater international authority.
Clearly, basic power capabilities are necessary for a dominant state to earn international authority by producing order, defending subordinates, and enforcing rules. Once established, moreover, authority and order tend to attract additional subordinates. Although the metaphor is inapt, one might think of order as a black hole.
On the supply side, producing order, defending subordinates, and enforcing rules tend to have large economies of scale (Lake 1999a) , explaining why authority tends to cluster at the regional level or why most states in an area become subordinate to the same dominant state at roughly the same time (Lake 2009b Schultz and Weingast 2003) . Here, the tighter are the fetters on the dominant state, the better able it is to attract subordinates.
Liberal states have, by definition, small public spheres in which they wield authority. In polities with large public spheres (small private spheres), the state possesses authority over a wide range of issues and practices. At an extreme, in totalitarian societies the state claims the authority to regulate legitimately all human interactions, although this is usually not possible in practice. In polities with small public spheres (large private spheres), the state possesses only limited and highly constrained authority. Liberal states, thus, possess only limited legitimate powers over their own people, and are explicitly denied the right to regulate many social, religious, "personal" and even political practices.
The limited state is enshrined in the rights of free speech, association, religion, and others often associated with the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Small public spheres, in turn, are associated with a larger reliance on market forces. Rather than regulating the behavior of many private actors, liberal states must rely on the discipline of the market. The small public sphere in liberal states, in turn, is defended by powerful domestic constituencies who govern their own areas within society, be these owners of firms who regulate their own business practices and relations with employees or clan or religious leaders who set and enforce rules on the social behaviors of their members. This is a type of "compliance constituency" first discussed in the literature on international law, but applied at the domestic level (Kahler 2001, 291-293) .
Dependent on markets, and accustomed to large realms of private authority, liberal states then generalize their own governance systems to the international level, if possible (Lake 1999b; Ikenberry 2001; 2011) . They desire access to the markets of subordinate states, but for the same reasons as at home are not necessarily interested in or able to regulate large areas of social and economic relations. States that are liberal at home are likely to be liberal abroad. By extension, the same domestic constituencies that enforce limits on the state at home also enforce limits on the home state when it controls policy areas in subordinates in which they are invested. Private firms, for instance, who oppose government regulation in their domestic economy will likewise oppose attempts by their government to regulate their actions in the subordinate states, and will even press their home government to constrain regulation by the subordinate state government to the extent it retains sovereignty within the relevant issue area. The same for religious and other social groups; religious organizations that enforce the separation of church and state at home will oppose home government attempts to limit their proselytizing within subordinate states as well. Although "democratic imperialism" is not unknown, it nearly always takes less hierarchical forms than in its more authoritarian variants and occurs most frequently when the subordinate population can be more clearly differentiated from the home population by clear racial or ethnic categories and unequal treatment can be intellectually or politically justified (on the latter, see Crawford 2002 ).
In addition, liberal states have a larger number of veto players than non-liberal states, and these points of potential blockage make it harder for such states to deviate from the status quo (Cowhey 1993; Tsebelis 2002 
Why is there so little war and change?
For Gilpin, international order is transient and nearly always destroyed in hegemonic war, only like the Phoenix to rise again from the ashes. Once order is established, the hegemon will eventually suffer shower economic growth, higher costs of protection, increased consumption at the expense of investment, a shift to less productive services, and the corrupting effects of affluence and preeminence (Gilpin 1981, 166) . As these effects mount, the hegemon can no longer sustain its leadership. Although it could increase the resources devoted to maintaining its international position or retrench by reducing its international commitment, these strategies simply forestall the inevitable decline and may, in fact, either worsen rates of internal investment or stimulate challengers (Gilpin 1981, 188) . With the declining hegemon holding to the status quo, change usually occurs only through a global conflagration over control of the system. This dynamic view of international power nonetheless neglects the problem of "hegemonic afterglow" in which the hegemon continues to provide order and, more importantly, subordinates continue to comply with its rules long after they "should" (Krasner 1976; Brawley 1999) . It also fails to account for challenges that do not occur, including the United States against Britain in the late 19 th century and Japan against the United States in the late 20 th century. As above, some minimal level of coercive capability is necessary to sustain international order, but the relationship between power capabilities and authority is not tightly correlated. Powerful countries can abuse their authority and lose their right to rule, much as the Soviet Union did in Eastern Europe. Conversely, dominant states can lose some of their coercive capabilities without an erosion of international order and, thus, the basis of their authority. Subordinates who benefit from that order can emerge to support the declining hegemon as it declines, as did the United States in the late 19 th century for
Britain and Japan and Germany did in the 1970s for the United States (Lake 1988) . Even more important, however, is that international order transforms the political economies of subordinate states and creates interests vested in that particular international order. Once this happens, challenges to the hegemon decline and compliance naturally increases. This does not imply that order lasts forever. Gilpin is likely right that declining capabilities and conflicts of interest will eventually provoke challenges to the international order from those least embedded in its rules -as were Germany and Russian in the Pax Britannica and Russia and China have been in the Pax Americana. But order can have strong dynamic effects that allow it to "entrap" some challengers and endure long after the hegemon's coercive capabilities have waned.
Political authority is largely self-enforcing because of the vested interests --a term of opprobrium to political reformers --that accumulate in the societies of both dominant and subordinate states. 7 The effect of vested interests is seen most easily, perhaps, in the contrast between liberal market economies (LMEs) and organized market economies (OMEs) (Hall and Soskice 2001; see also Gourevitch and Shinn 2005) . LMEs have large private spheres of authority, rely more on market-based allocation systems, and offer fewer social protections. In turn, both firms and workers develop flexible economic strategies that discourage investments in specific processes or skills, creating a large pool of "generic" capital and labor that flows (relatively) easily across sectors.
Having invested in flexible production and skills, however, society has little motivation to press government for policies that encourage long term holding of assets, apprenticeship programs tailored to long term employment contracts, and other features common in OMEs. Adapted for flexibility, changing policies are of less import for societal actors and, in turn, the political arena is characterized by institutions that if they do not amplify at least do not dampen political swings, such single-member electoral districts and majority party rule. The economy and its political actors are vested in a particular, self-reinforcing mode of production in which liberal markets yield more liberal markets. OMEs, by contrast, have larger public spheres, rely less on market forces, and have more counter-cyclical social protection programs. Both firms and workers expect to be engaged in long term relationships, so both have incentives to invest in specific skill and asset acquisition. Having invested in high skill-oriented production, in turn, both firms and workers have incentives to press government for a steady flow of equally welltrained workers and counter-cyclical social programs that will tide them through market downturns and sustain investment in these specific assets. Since policy instability would threaten to undermine these incentives, the political system is structured for centrism, either through proportional representation electoral systems or coalition governments in which centrist parties are pivotal. Organized markets follow organized markets. In both, policies breed self-interests in maintaining the political authorities that produce those policies.
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Over time, subordinate states have become vested in the American-led international order. As within countries, states develop interests in sustaining the international order to which they have adapted and prospered. Through such vesting, the international order also becomes self-enforcing. At the most general level, globalization rewards winners and punishes losers, tilting the political playing field increasingly in favor of the former and against the latter (Rogowski 1989) . Export interests and others that benefit from an open world economy grow and expand their political influence.
Import-competing sectors and others that lose steadily shrink in size and influence; textiles and shoes, once core industries in the protectionist coalition in the United States, are no longer a political force (Hathaway 1998) . Exporters become ever more dependent on world markets and the national economy becomes increasingly specialized. These "internationalist" interests, in turn, develop stronger interests in maintaining market openness, both at home and abroad (Milner 1988 truly are anarchic that was frequently invoked prior to the war --subordinates were more than twice as likely to join the "coalition of the willing" than non-subordinates (Lake 2009c, 19) . This was in part symbolic obeisance, a form of legitimating American rule, but it also reflects the deeply vested nature of the subordinates into the international order created and maintained by the United States. Subordinates were compelled to support the United States not by force but by the dependence of their own economies and societies on the particular order built by the Washington in the Middle East. They are "locked in" to the American order not by institutions, but their own domestic constituencies that benefit from the existing structure of rules and the corresponding outcomes.
The main point here is that the interests of subordinate states are not fixed or exogenous but are endogenous to international order. As order and its attendant benefits are created, groups within subordinate countries become vested in that order and will encourage their governments to both comply with the rules and support that order should it start to erode or come under challenge. This allows order to persist long after the initial distribution of capabilities on which it originally rested has changed. The international institutions on which others have focused, and that are constructed within that order, clearly have some residual effects in reinforcing order, as old institutions continue to provide value by facilitating cooperation and are a sunk cost that must be paid anew if a different order is to be created (Keohane 1984; Ikenberry 2001) . But what ultimately makes those institutions and order robust are the social interests vested in that order who have compelling reasons to follow the rules and support the order in general against possible challengers.
Today, many countries are deeply vested in the American-led order. Hegemony is less fragile than the distribution of capabilities alone would suggest. As a result, political change and the deep conflicts of interest that can lead to hegemonic war are less frequent than expected by a focus on coercion alone.
Conclusion: Will China be a spoiler or supporter?
With its vast population, large territory, and rapidly growing economy, China's aggregate GDP will soon surpass that of the United States (Bergsten et al. 2009 ).
Although it will still be a "poor" country with an average per capita income far below that in developed states, its sheer economic size will soon permit it to be a major player on the world scene and to deploy a global military reach equal to that of the United States (Tammen et al. 2000; Mearsheimer 2001 ). This increase in Chinese power will almost certainly give rise to new demands for greater influence in international affairs, including over the rules of the American-led order (Friedberg 2005) . Although the United States might prefer to retain its current position as the leading power, there is little it can do to arrest this future shift in power capabilities (Beeson 2009 ).
The authoritative nature of international order, however, creates the possibility for integrating China into the American-led international system. Embedding China into an order that protects the territorial integrity and generates prosperity for all from secure property rights, monetary stability, and trade openness, promises benefits to Beijing from living within this system that will likely exceed those of a Chinese-led alternative if this can only be obtained by forcibly challenging the United States (Jacques 2009; Halper 2010) ; if so, the benefits of consenting to American authority, or at least participating in a system of American-made rules, may be greater than the prospects of a costly confrontation.
China is also developing -perhaps unwittingly --its own compliance constituencies that hold out the promise of transforming Beijing over time into a supporter of the American system. Following the path of Japan, South Korea, and the other Asian "tigers," China is pursuing a strategy of export-led growth that depends on the continued openness and health of an open world economy dominated by the United
States and its subordinates and governed by rules agreed upon by those same countries.
Although China is not a "small country" in absolute terms, it is still both a "price taker"
in world markets and a "policy taker" in international institutions. To date, it is largely conforming to the existing system as it develops (Johnston 2003; Drezner 2007) . In turn, it is also accumulating domestic interests that are vested in the current international order and who may, in the years ahead, become an important political force that backs living within rather than challenging the American order (Moore and Yang 2001; but see Shirk 2007 ).
This is the promise of cooperation rather than confrontation with China, often left implicit and seldom linked to issues of authority by its proponents. The more deeply
China is integrated into the current world order, the less likely it will be to challenge America's authority in the future, even as its coercive capabilities grow. The United
States succeeded Britain as hegemon without undue conflict, perhaps because both were relatively liberal states that shared similar preferences over the nature of international order. As a non-liberal state, China's preferred international order is less likely to mirror that constructed by the United States, and greater political tensions are probably inevitable in the years ahead. Nonetheless, integrating China into the open world economy is likely to create compliance constituencies that support the American-led order, and may actually serve to liberalize China over time. Future relations will be conditioned on whether China can be vested into the existing American-led international order. We may not know this for a decade or more, but the potential payoffs seem sufficiently high that it is worth running some risk that trade now will enhance the wealth and power of a possibly autonomous and antagonistic China in the future. The larger, more vibrant, and more prosperous the American order, the larger the incentives for China to join with rather than challenge the United States. This holds out a hope that, while change is inevitable, hegemonic war is not.
